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JURISPRUDENCE
CHRISTIAN ADVOCACY
An interesting, though somewhat disturbing, article by Mr. Charles
P. Curtis of the Massachusetts Bar recently appeared in the Stanford
Law Review." The article discussed the ethics which should guide a
lawyer when he acts on behalf of his client. He developed two points:
that the lawyer's duty to his client is so high that "he is required to treat
outsiders as if they were barbarians and enemies ;,12 and that the practice
of law is outside of and divorced from Christian moral ethics. In
furthering his first point Mr. Curtis develops at length the proposition
that the advocate has the duty to lie for his client whenever that becomes
necessary to protect his client's interests. And on his second assertion
he states that Stoicism is the only acceptable philosophy for lawyers. I
submit that both of Mr. Curtis' propositions are demonstrably false and
manifestly dangerous to society.
I
Mr. Curtis first argues that, since a lawyer would lie for his wife and
child, and even for friends if close enough, as would every person, then
he should lie for his client with whom he stands in such intimate relation-
ship. The truth does not belong to the lawyer, but to the client, and
therefore he is not free to give this to others. Mere silence quite often
does not protect the truth, and for this reason it is better for the lawyer
to lie. How far may he carry this? Mr. Curt is says that he must lie
"beyond the point where he could permissibly lie for himself."
3
But this is not true, for a lie is an intrinsic evil and is never per-
missible. It is a deliberate word, sign, or action by which a person
conveys to another an idea contrary to his own mind. The nature of
man is frustrated in three particulars by a lie: it places the will at
variance with the intellect; it defeats the ends of speech, i.e., the com-
munication of ideas; and it makes that society which is natural and
essential to man impossible, or at least difficult. God has not designed
the nature of man in order for man to oppose it, but rather for man to
follow it. When a person perverts a natural faculty he is transgressing
the natural law. Every violation of a just law is a wrong of some sort,
and a violation of the law of God is a wrong of the gravest sort. It
has been said that when a man knowingly and willingly says that which
belies his own inner convictions, he does violence to his own nature, he
outrages his own dignity, he misuses his God-given faculty of speech,
and he introduces discord into his soul. St. Paul has told us, "Putting
'Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STA,;. L. REv. 3 (1951).
2 Ibid., p. 6.
3 Ibid., p. 8
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away lying, speak ye the truth every man with his neighbor, for we are
members of one another."4 And we are told in the Old Testament that
a lie is abominated and hated by the Lord.5 What is intrinsically evil is
never permitted, no matter by whom committed or for how fine a reason.
Distinguished from the direct falsehood is a mental reservation.
By a mental reservation we mean the act of the mind which limits the
common and ordinary sense of the words used to some particular
meaning intended by the speaker. This is called a strict mental reserva-
tion when there are no circumstances present which would permit the
hearer to suspect that the words used are so limited. Thus, when a
person asks, "Did you take my wallet ?" and he is answered, "No"-the
answerer meaning that he did not take it in the past few minutes-you
have a strict mental reservation, for there is no clue as to the limitation
which the answerer intends. Such a reservation differs not at all from
a lie, and is therefore immoral on the same grounds and to the same
extent as the lie.
However, where a mental reservation is used in such circumstances
that the hearer knows or should know that the answerer intends a
limitation of his words, we have what is known as a broad mental
reservation. If, for example, an attorney is asked if his client committed
a certain crime and he answers, "No," the questioner should know, if he
does not, that the attorney meant, "Not for your information." The
broad mental reservation may be used without culpability in certain
circumstances, viz., where the person questioned has either the right or
the duty to keep the requested information secret and silence will not
accomplish this, and where the questioner has no right to know the
truth. It differs from the lie in that the words spoken do not differ
from the truth as apprehended by the mind of the speaker. But even
though not lies, this type of mental reservation can be employed only
where the proper conditions are present, for indiscriminate use would
destroy all mutual trust among men.
Equivocation may or may not be morally used depending upon the
circumstances. As we ordinarily understand equivocation it is the use
of terms having two or more significations with an intent to deceive the
hearer. In this sense equivocation may never be used, for it is a lie and
nothing more. It is so defined in the dictionary. But where we mean the
use of ambiguous terms for the purpose of concealing the truth from
one who is merely officious in asking, equivocation may be used under
the same conditions as a broad mental reservation. If the listener is
deceived, he is deceived by himself and not by the speaker.
Now we all recognize the right of a man to conceal certain things.
4 Eph., IV, 25.
5 Prov., VI, 17; XII, 22.
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No man is obliged under any circumstances to reveal his sins or crimes,
except to God or his confessor. Further, the natural law permits a man
to do all that is necessary to preserve his own dignity and independence,
and the concealment of his personal affairs is necessary to accomplish
this. Therefore a man has a right to keep his own secrets. And for the
same reason he has a right to keep the secrets of another. But when a
man is in possession of another's secrets, as in the case of a lawyer with
regard to the personal affairs of his client, he has not only the right, but
also the positive duty, not to divulge them. Justice requires that nothing
be taken from a man which belongs to him alone. This refers not only to
his property or life, but to his secrets as well. The attorney, therefore,
has a duty not to divulge his client's affairs. This duty ceases only where
keeping the secret will harm the lawyer, a third person, or the com-
munity. Where the harm will accrue to the attorney, he has a right to
break his trust only if the harm is all out of proportion to the importance
of the secret to his client. But where the harm will accrue to a third
person or to the community, the lawyer's right to break his trust becomes
a duty to do so. High though the lawyer's duty to his client may be,
he has an even higher duty to the common weal. This involves pre-
venting harm to society or to innocent members of society."
But although the lawyer has a duty to keep his client's confidences,
he may not lie to do so. This is, as we have said, intrinsically evil and
never permitted. But he may answer any question regarding his client
by the use of a broad mental reservation, providing the three conditions
are fulfilled. As said previously, the lawyer has not only the right but
the duty to keep his client's secrets. And as often as not silence will not
suffice in the face of direct questions to keep certain information private.
The difficulty comes in the third condition, i.e., that the person asking
does not have a right to know the truth. Mr. Curtis gives the example
of a lawyer who has persuaded a client, wanted by the police, to give
himself up. After a meeting with the client in which the latter promises
to give himself up in two days, giving him time to clean up his affairs,
the lawyer is asked by a police official if he has seen his client. Mr.
Curtis believes that the lawyer is justified in answering, "No." This is
questionable, though, as even Mr. Curtis himself admits. He resolves
the question in favor of his own thesis, but it seems that the lawyer
would in such a case be morally bound to answer the policeman truth-
fully. For it seems to us that the police have the right to know the
whereabouts of wanted criminals. The safety of the public depends
upon this right.
o Canon 37, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs, American Bar Association,
provides that, "The announced intention of a client to commit a crime is not
included within the confidences which he (the lawyer) is bound to respect.
He may properly make such disclosures as may be necessary to prevent the
act or protect those against whom it is threatened."
19521
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The lawyer's duty towards his client outside of court is clear. But
what may he do in court? May he lie? May he make use of broad
mental reservations? May he keep material matters secret if the oppos-
ing side or the court does not have cognizance of them? Mr. Curtis
says that,
"I take it that it is inadmissible to lie to the court. A
lawyer's duty to his client cannot rise higher than its source,
which is the court."
7
This much is true-it is inadmissible to lie to the court, since it is
inadmissible to lie at any time. Nor may use be made of a broad mental
reservation, simply because it is impossible to fulfill the third condition.
It is the duty of the court to mete out justice. This is impossible if the
trier of the case does not have all of the facts or law at his command.
The court, then, has a right to know those things which are material to
the case. And where the questioner has a right to know the truth of
that which he asks, nothing less than the absolute truth may in good
conscience be given. This is the case where the lawyer is asked about
a certain matter. The same duty to disclose is not present, however,
where no question has been put to him. Mr. Curtis is undoubtedly
correct when he says that the attorney has no duty to argue his op-
ponent's case for him, or to supply arguments, facts, or law which his
opponent has neglected. Mere silence cannot be a lie, nor even a mental
reservation, since nothing at all is said. Silence in and of itself does not
cause but merely permits the court to draw erroneous conclusions. This
assumes, however, that there is no injustice latent in the silence. If the
lawyer knows or discovers that a fraud is being practiced on the court or
the opposing party, he is in duty bound to speak. But this rests upon
his obligation to practice justice, and not upon his duty not to lie.
The whole question of the lawyer's conduct in or out of court does not
rest upon the proposition that the lawyer's duty to his client cannot rise
higher than his duty to the court, although this is true enough, but,
rather, upon the indisputable fact that his duty to his client cannot rise
higher than his duty to his God. The Canons of Professional Ethics
recognize this:
"The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it
demand of him for any client, violation of law or any manner of
fraud or chicane. He inust obey his own conscience and not
that of his client."" (Italics added).
II
An interesting omission in the Stanford article is any discussion of
what cases a lawyer may take. Apparently Mr. Curtis assumes that he
7 Curtis, supra, note 1, at p. 7.
8 Can. 15.
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may take any case presented to him. This, of course, is not true. In
criminal cases there is no doubt but what a lawyer may take any case,
whether he knows the accused is guilty or not, since both the natural
and the positive law accord the guilty as well as the innocent a right of
defense.9 But in civil cases the attorney is more restricted. Offenses
against the virtue of justice are sinful, and the lawyer who prosecutes
an unjust claim is a cooperator in the sin. Therefore, when the cause
is unjust, the case may not be undertaken. The lawyer, however, is not
bound to inquire into the motives of his client. If the action is founded
upon recognized principles of law, he may prosecute it. But he may not
participate in his client's immoral intent, if such there be. Nor may he
advise his client how to skirt the law in order to achieve an unjust end.
Often an attorney accepts a case which appears on its face to be just
or at least probably just. These cases he may prosecute to a successful
conclusion, even if they are objectively unjust, just so long as he himself
believes in its justice. If he is in doubt he may in good faith accept the
case, for, after all, the purpose of the suit is to settle the doubt. But if at
any time during the suit he recognizes that it is actually unjust, he
must withdraw. St. Thomas states the lawyer's obligation in this
manner:
"If in the beginning the lawyer believed the case to be just,
and afterward in the procedure it becomes evident that it is
unjust, he must not betray the case, in such wise as to help the
other side, or to reveal the secrets of his case to the other party.
But he can and must abandon the case or induce his client to yield
or to compromise without injury to his adversary."10
Catholic moral teaching commands restitution by the attorney when
he has prosecuted an unjust case. If the injustice of the action is not
apparent to the attorney until after the conclusion of all proceedings, he
must restore to the injured party whatever of the unjust gain he himself
has received in the way of fees. If his fee came, not out of the money
awarded in the judgment, but from his client's own money, he is not
bound to restitution. Also if he bows out of the case as soon as he
recognizes that it is an unjust cause, he is not bound to restitution, even
if his client subsequently wins. But if he accepts and prosecutes a case
which he knows to be unjust at the time, or if he continues to act in the
case after discovering its injustice, he is bound to restore to the injured
party, not only what he himself has received, but all that that party has
lost, including the entire amount of his costs and disbursements.
9 See O'Connell, Moral and Ethical Considerations in the Defense of Those
Accused of Crime, 35 MARQ. L. REv. 311 (1952).
10 ST. THOMAs AQUINAs, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, l-II, lxxxi, in, 2. Canon 44
of the Canons of Professional Ethics recognizes injustice as a reason which
permits a lawyer to withdraw from a case once taken.
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Nothing excuses from this obligation except restitution to the injured
party by the client.
III
Christianity, according to Mr. Curtis, has no place in the practice
of law. He contends that the lawyer fails in his duty to his client if he
represents him as a Christian. Mr. Curtis prefers Stoicism.
"The Stoics gave us counsel of perfection, but it is none the
less valid. If a lawyer is to be the best lawyer he is capable of
being, and discharge his 'entire duty' to his clients, here in the
Stoic sage is his exemplar. Here in Stoicism is his philosophy.
Let him be a Christian if he chooses outside the practice of the
law, but in his relations with his clients, let him be a Stoic, for the
better Stoic, the better lawyer.""'
All of which is utter nonsense. In the first place Christianity is not
something that you turn on or off at will, that you practice from 5:00
P.M. to 8:00 A.M. only. Quite to the contrary, it is a complete way of
life. It is that relationship with God that controls the totality of man's
actions. God will not be shut out during business hours. If a man is
truly a Christian, he is a Christian twenty-four hours a day, all the days
of his life. If he is only a Christian when it is convenient, he is no
Christian at all.
The lawyer does not fail in his duty when he represents his client as
a Christian, for as a Christian he is in conscience bound to deal honestly
and fairly with him. The client may in perfect faith entrust his affairs
to such a man. He is not so safe, however, where his attorney acts on
the assumption that there is no God. If there is no higher moral law
which prevents the attorney from lying for his client, then there is none
which prevents him from lying to his client. The good pagan cannot be
trusted, for there is nothing which will keep him good when it is to his
advantage to be bad. Stoicism failed centuries ago, and it will just as
surely fail today.
Our courts have said over and over again that this is a Christian
nation.1 2 The fact that non-Christian minorities are protected under the
law, both moral and positive, does not make it any the less a Christian
nation. Ethical problems are expected to be viewed in a Christian state
in the light of Christian morality. The nation's courts are entitled to
expect, and in practice they do expect, that the lawyers practicing before
them will be guided in their actions by sound moral principles. But why
do we say Christian morals? After all. morality is one for all mankind.
The primary dictate of the natural law-that good must be done and
evil avoided-is binding upon every race and nation and religion in-
discriminately. And indeed it is so recogniied. But the more particular
rules under this primary law differ, as wit-ess Mr. Curtis' principles.
"I Curtis, supra note 1, at p. 20.
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Men see "the good" in different lights. Obviously not all are correct.
If there is a God, and if Christ is God, then only Christian moral teach-
ings are correct. Since the nation is Christian there can be no excuse for
deviation from these moral principles. And the lawyer is no more
excused than is any other man.
The article by Mr. Curtis argues in essence that the lawyer's duty to
his client is superior to his duty to God. With this we cannot agree.
Vice and virtue are not so intermingled and indistinguishable that they
may be practiced unselectively.1 3 Vice by its very definition may never
be practiced. God is the supreme and ultimate end of man. But man will
never reach his ultimate end if he places a higher value on temporal
ends. The lawyer's duty to his client is high. There can be no argument
there. But never does his duty rise so high that he must sacrifice his
eternal salvation to perform it.
I sincerely doubt if Mr. Curtis means all that he said, and I doubt if
he practices all that he meant. For I submit that an acceptance of these
doctrines would result in a flood of sharp practices, dishonest lawyers,
unjust lawsuits, and perjurous testimony. I submit that it would bring
shame and disrepute on the law profession. Lawyer Curtis may be an
able lawyer, but he is less than mediocre as an ethician.
JAMES E. HARPsTER
12 See, for example, Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S.
457, 12 S.Ct. 511, 36 L.Ed. 226 (1892); Townsend v. Hagan et al., 35 Iowa
194 (1872).
13"I don't know any other career that offers ampler opportunity for both the
enjoyment of virtue and the exercise of vice, or, if you please, the exercise
of virtue and the enjoyment of vice, except possibly the ancient rituals which
were performed in some temples by vestal virgins, in others by sacred proti-
tutes." Curtis, supra, note 1, at p. 18.
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